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International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Advance Access originally published online on July 24, 2008
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2008 8(3):379-398; doi:10.1093/irap/lcn010
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© The author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

This article appears in the following International Relations of the Asia-Pacific issue: SPECIAL ISSUE: Research outcomes from the AsiaBarometer project [View the issue table of contents]

Is there an aid-for-participation deal?: US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants

Atsushi Tago

Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
Email: tago{at}dragon.kobe-u.ac.jp

There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states; the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support.

Received for publication February 25, 2008. Accepted for publication June 12, 2008.


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