International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Advance Access originally published online on March 3, 2006
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2006 6(2):189-207; doi:10.1093/irap/lci141
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Putin's foreign policy toward North Korea
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 3619 O Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20007, USA. Email: yt75{at}georgetown.edu
Since coming to office in 2000, President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has taken a pragmatic and calculating approach to the conduct of foreign policy in order to promote Russia's geopolitical and economic interests. For him, a higher profile on Korean issues has been an opportunity to show that Moscow can influence Pyongyang and play a meaningful role in great power diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. As a result of active diplomacy toward North Korea, the two former communist allies put a period to the deteriorating relations in the 1990s; after the September 11 terrorists attack and the launch of the war on terrorism Moscow's influence over Pyongyang reached its peak. The beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, however, relegated Moscow to a marginalized position in the Korean issue. This paper examines how Putin's pragmatic diplomacy was put into effect in Russia's foreign policy toward North Korea and how circumstances on the Korean peninsula have affected Russia–DPRK bilateral relations. An analysis of these factors shows why Russia's role in the ongoing Six-Party process has become insignificant. At the present time, it is certainly plausible that Russia will not activate diplomatic efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and will be satisfied with merely securing a seat at the multilateral talks in Northeast Asia.